







Coherent Capital Structure Policy: Between 
Bailouts and the Interest Deduction 
Jeff Gordon† 
The Federal Reserve’s recent, unprecedented corporate debt 
purchases will further reduce the cost of corporate debt relative to equity. 
Given the already high degree of leverage in the corporate sector, I argue 
that this is a dangerous policy choice. However, the best solution is not to 
outlaw the Fed’s crisis actions, but to reform other federal laws that create 
a debt bias in aggregate. I show how limiting the corporate interest 
deduction to those firms with a responsible debt-equity ratio would 
harmonize the goals of tax policy and bailout policy, establishing a 
coherent “capital structure policy” for the first time. 
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Introduction 
In the spring of 2020, the Federal Reserve announced its plans to 
purchase several hundred billion dollars of corporate debt as part of an 
effort to stem the nation’s economic collapse in the wake of the COVID-
19 pandemic. This unprecedented move has occasioned a vibrant debate, 
mainly centering on whether the Fed had the legal authority and political 
legitimacy to intervene so directly in the non-financial economy (usually, 
the Fed lends only to banks, not to other firms).1 Those debates are 
important, but they are not the only important policy implications of the 
Fed’s actions. In this Note, I take the Fed’s corporate debt programs as a 
given—as part of the “new normal” response we can expect in an economic 
crisis—and ask how this should inform all the other law and policy that 
bears on corporate debt. The principle guiding my analysis is that law 
should, at the least, be neutral with respect to corporate capital structure, 
or better yet should encourage more equity finance and less debt finance 
relative to prevailing conditions in 2020. And yet, in several important 
respects, law does the opposite. 
Perhaps the most important one, and the focus of this Note, is the 
corporate tax law’s favorable treatment of debt—a corporation’s interest 
payments on its debt are tax-deductible, up to a limit.2 That feature of the 
tax law has been hotly debated for decades. Wherever one stands on that 
debate, even if one thinks the law achieved capital structure neutrality as 
of February 2020, it is hard to argue that is still the case after the Fed’s 
intervention, which revealed an implicit government subsidy for all 
corporate debt, similar to the widely-acknowledged implicit subsidy for 
bank debt.3 And while the Fed’s intervention undoubtedly boosted the 
equity markets as well, I argue that the benefit will accrue 
disproportionately to bondholders. The combined effect of federal 
policy—tax, financial regulatory, and macroeconomic—is that the 
 
1. See Lev Menand, Unappropriated Dollars: The Fed’s Ad Hoc Lending Facilities and 
the Rules That Govern Them, (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
518/2020, 2020). 
2. See 26 U.S.C. 163(j). 
3. See Section II.C infra. 
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government now encourages corporations to fund themselves with debt 
over equity. By late May of 2020, U.S. corporations had reached $1 trillion 
in debt issuance for the year, by far the fastest that milestone had ever been 
reached.4 Given the risks of too much debt—from distress and bankruptcy 
at the individual firm level to serial defaults and the possibility of 
deflationary deleveraging at the macroeconomic level—this is not the right 
balance for policy to strike. If effective, the Fed’s interventions may make 
these dangerous possibilities less likely in the short term. But by increasing 
the incentive to take on debt, the Fed risks inducing an even more painful 
debt-driven crisis in the future. 
I argue that tax policy should level the playing field, either by ending 
corporate debt’s deductibility or by conditioning deductibility on a target 
debt-equity ratio. In this latter proposal, the federal government would 
counterbalance its pro-debt bailout policies by reducing tax benefits for the 
most indebted corporations. A key pillar of this argument is that the 
government can more effectively limit corporate debt through the tax code 
than in the terms of its lending programs themselves. Under the status quo, 
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act takes 
the opposite approach. The Act requires that corporations make several 
commitments before receiving government loans, including restrictions on 
dividends, share buybacks, and executive compensation as well as 
commitments to maintain employment levels. While these requirements 
may be appropriate and sensible demands, it is important to note that the 
vast majority of firms that benefit from the Fed’s new programs will not be 
subject to them. This is because, as I discuss at greater length, the Fed’s 
new lending facilities had major effect even before any money was 
disbursed, and will likely continue to generate an implicit subsidy even for 
the majority of corporations that never borrow from them.5 Therefore, any 
federal debt limitation conditioned on actually receiving a loan will be 
limited relative to the total capital market intervention. 
In order to reach the whole universe of corporate borrowers, the 
government would need to extend its debt limitation to some area of 
federal law that every firm already must interact with. Tax law fits the bill. 
The interest deduction, modified as I propose, could help offset the pro-
debt slant of the federal government’s new open-ended lending 
arrangement with corporate America. This arrangement would reflect a 
novel integration of tax policy, financial regulatory policy, and 
macroeconomic policy, insofar as they all bear on corporate capital 
structure. 
 
4. Ben Winck, U.S. Corporate Bond Sales Surge Past the $1 Trillion Threshold at the 
Fastest Pace Ever, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2020), https://markets.businessinsider.com/ 
news/stocks/corporate-bond-sales-reach-trillion-fastest-pace-ever-debt-market-2020-5-
1029258342 [https://perma.cc/4YBY-EA6A]. 
5. See Section II.B infra. 
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Of course, it is common for tax policy to serve various non-tax aims, 
but proposals for enlisting the tax system to prevent macroeconomic crises 
and spur economic recoveries have only just begun to be discussed in 
recent years.6 And still, up to this point, legal scholars have analyzed the 
policies that influence corporate borrowing in separate silos. Corporate tax 
scholars regularly discuss the influence of the interest deduction on 
corporate debt issuance.7 Observers of emergency economic rescue 
programs have noted the effect of bailout packages, and the ongoing 
expectation thereof, on interest rates, though there the discussion has been 
mainly limited to banks.8 Beyond bailouts, much discussion of the Dodd-
Frank Act has pertained to the capital requirements in that law and related 
proposals for regulating bank capital structure.9 And bankruptcy scholars 
have observed that creditors’ expectations of recovering their claims in the 
bankruptcy system will influence interest rates and, in turn, firms’ capital 
structure.10 It is perfectly reasonable to analyze a given area of law with an 
eye toward its effect on corporate capital structure, effectively holding all 
other areas of law constant. But my argument here is that we can do better 
by taking into account those parallel areas of law that may be duplicating 
or undermining each individual intervention. The goal is a coherent 
“capital structure policy”—a policy regulating firms’ choices between debt 
and equity—across all relevant areas of federal law. 
Before proceeding, it is worth asking: why take the Fed’s recent 
actions as the “new normal” and move to put other policies in equilibrium, 
rather than argue against the Fed’s corporate lending on the grounds that 
it throws pre-existing policies (here, capital structure neutrality) out of 
balance? First, an economic crisis is the most important time for the 
government to support the private sector (for example, by subsidizing 
debt).11 And with only a bit of hindsight, the Fed’s programs seem to have 
worked, at least on their own terms: corporate interest spreads tightened 
and borrowing surged in the weeks and months after their 
 
6. See, e.g., YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO 
RECESSIONS (2019); Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The 
Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187 (2010); Yair 
Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating 
Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2012). 
7. See Section III.B infra. 
8. See Section II.C infra. 
9. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-
Cyclical Bank Capital, 125 ECON. J. F131 (2015); John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk after Dodd-
Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011); Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2014).  
10. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1199 (2005); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in 
Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011). 
11. See generally LISTOKIN, supra note 6. 
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announcement.12 Even for those who believe that Congress and the Fed 
should not have intervened in bond markets, it is practically very difficult 
to tie the government’s hands from doing something similar in the future.13 
In an economic crisis, it seems that all bets are off and legal restrictions 
once thought firm (such as that the Fed may only lend against steady 
collateral) suddenly become flimsy. It is comparatively easier to adjust 
policy in “normal” times to account for likely deviations in a crisis than to 
prevent those deviations from occurring. This may be one of the signal 
principles of “law and macroeconomics,” and policymakers would be wise 
to acknowledge it and make the necessary adjustments to achieve their 
goals (for example, capital structure neutrality) in aggregate across the 
business cycle. In this light, it should be clear that there is nothing 
pejorative in my use of the term “bailout.” My analysis may overlap with 
those who see “moral hazard” in the Fed’s lending programs, but without 
any of the condemnation that term carries. Bailouts can be useful, and in 
any case, are likely to recur, and so it is more productive to focus on the 
other aspects of federal law that duplicate bailouts’ effect on debt. 
This Note will proceed as follows. Part I presents background on the 
corporate debt market. Part II introduces Congress and the Federal 
Reserve’s recent actions to support the corporate debt market. Evidence 
from corporate finance suggests that the Fed’s implicit guarantee will 
reduce the cost of debt, even for firms that do not actually use the new 
lending facilities. I argue that the Fed targeted debt primarily for legal and 
institutional reasons rather than as a matter of encouraging a particular 
capital structure. In other words, the reduced cost of debt in relation to 
equity is a collateral consequence rather than the intended goal of these 
actions. And so, while an alternative reform might enable the Fed to buy 
equity in a crisis, I suggest that doing so would be too discordant with the 
Fed’s accustomed institutional role. It is therefore crucial to minimize the 
collateral harms of it buying debt. Part III turns to the tax law. Tax scholars 
have articulated many reasons why corporate debt should not be tax 
deductible, including: capital structure neutrality, macroeconomic risk, 
misallocation of corporate investment, and deadweight loss in litigating the 
arguably untenable distinction between debt and equity. I show that even 
those who are not convinced by these arguments should acknowledge that, 
even if the tax law is internally capital structure neutral, the whole of 
federal law and policy no longer is. In Part IV, I discuss options for 
reforming the interest deduction. Fully eliminating the distinction between 
debt and equity for tax purposes should be on the table, as scholars have 
argued for years. But legislative proposals in several recent Congresses 
 
12. See Section II.B infra. 
13. Todd A. Gormley, Simon Johnson, & Changyong Rhee, Ending “Too Big To Fail”: 
Government Promises vs. Investor Perceptions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17518, 2011) (showing that investors expect governments to bail out failing banks, even when 
governments state that they will refrain from doing so). 
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suggest that Republicans would only be interested in eliminating the 
interest deduction in exchange for something worse (full expensing). As a 
more politically achievable and targeted alternative, I propose 
conditioning interest deductibility on capital structure: specifically, on 
meeting a target debt-to-equity ratio. Part V concludes, mentioning several 
other areas of law that should adjust to acknowledge the “new normal” of 
the federal government’s debt backstop. 
I. Corporate Debt and Macroeconomic Risk 
In this Part, I review the reasons why corporate debt may pose a 
danger to the economy, and why the benefits of corporate debt do not 
outweigh those risks. Highly leveraged firms have a procyclical effect on 
the economy. Historical analysis indicates that economic expansions 
marked by high credit growth in the private sector have been associated 
with relatively more severe ensuing recessions.14 This is because highly 
indebted firms tend to reduce investment more than less leveraged peers 
in the midst of a downturn.15 In other words, just when the economy needs 
new investment to create jobs, leveraged firms are forced to spend a large 
share of their cash flow on debt service and are unable to contribute to a 
recovery. This general historical pattern may be exacerbated by the 
breakneck lending practices of the 2010s. At the beginning of 2019, there 
was $9.3 trillion in outstanding U.S. corporate debt instruments.16 
Corporate borrowing surged in the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. 
Non-financial corporate debt climbed to 47% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) compared to 43% of GDP in 2010.17 The median ratio of debt to  
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
ratio for nonfinancial firms increased from 2.8 to 3.2 from 2009 to 2018.18 
 
14. Oscar Jordà et al., When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, and Crises, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17621, 2011) (‘‘[A] legacy of higher excess 
credit from the previous expansion creates an ever more painful post-peak trajectory.’’). 
15. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al., Debt Overhang, Rollover Risk, and Corporate 
Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis (Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Discussion 
Paper 12881, 2018); Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator 
and the Flight to Quality (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4789, 1994). 
16. U.S. Corporate Debt Market: The State of Play In 2019, S&P GLOBAL (May 17, 
2019), https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/u-s-corporate-debt-market-the-
state-of-play-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/STQ8-RJTM]. 
17. Corporate Bonds and Loans Are at the Centre of a New Financial Scare, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/03/12/ corporate-bonds-
and-loans-are-at-the-centre-of-a-new-financial-scare [https://perma.cc/ZG6E-2Y3X]. 
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For every dollar of revenue growth over the past decade, Fortune 500 
companies added almost a dollar of debt.19 
In analyzing the relationship between leverage and macroeconomic 
risk, it is useful to distinguish between excessive debt that sparks an 
economic crisis—as in the case of the 2008 financial crisis—and excessive 
debt that worsens a recession caused by a constellation of other factors. 
While the prospect of a debt-driven financial crisis gives stronger reason to 
reduce corporate leverage, both scenarios pose long-lasting harm to 
employment and economic growth and should be taken seriously as the 
cost of a pro-debt policy regime. 
A. Leverage and Financial Crisis 
The first and more devastating, if somewhat more remote, possibility 
is that recent corporate lending practices could trigger a financial crisis. 
Many market observers have noted that if corporate debt were to trigger a 
financial crisis, the most likely mechanism would be through “leveraged 
loans,” particularly those packaged through collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs).20 Because of their centrality to projections of possible financial 
instability, it is worth examining leveraged loans and CLOs in some 
detail.21 Leveraged loans are loans to corporations with some combination 
of high debt levels, low credit ratings, and high spreads. The idea behind a 
CLO is to bundle many leveraged loans whose default risks are (hopefully) 
uncorrelated, issue bonds backed by that bundle of loans, and then use the 
cash flow from the loans to pay off the CLO bonds, keeping the difference 
as profit for the CLO manager. In December 2019, the Financial Stability 
Board released a report warning about CLOs as a potential threat to 
 
19. Antoine Gara & Nathan Vardi, Inside the $2.5 Trillion Debt Binge That Has Taken 




20. See Peter Brennan, CLOs Could Pose Systemic Risk if Economy Goes Bad, FSB 
Says, S&P GLOBAL (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/ en/news-
insights/latest-news-headlines/56213653 [https://perma.cc/QNW4-5T47]; Frank Partnoy, The 
Looming Bank Collapse, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/coronavirus-banks-collapse/612247/ 
[https://perma.cc/CE75-FKSD]. For a skeptical response to Partnoy, see Nathan Tankus, Is There 
Really A “Looming Bank Collapse?”, NOTES ON THE CRISES (Jun. 11, 2020), 
https://nathantankus.substack.com/p/is-there-really-a-looming-bank-collapse 
[https://perma.cc/CNG2-TNS7].  
21. See generally Matt Wirz & Nick Timiraos, The Next Coronavirus Financial Crisis: 
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financial system stability.22 Some of the most concerning practices are 
worsening underwriting standards for leveraged loans, speculative 
accounting adjustments, and concentrated exposure to the same 
companies across CLOs.23 The fundamental concern is that leveraged loan 
defaults could be amplified through CLOs and thereby lead to broader 
financial system turmoil. 
One major reason why some observers are concerned about CLOs is 
that they appear similar to the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that 
played an instrumental role in the 2008 financial crisis. CDOs are financial 
instruments that pool together risky financial assets—in particular, during 
the pre-crisis years, the lower-rated tranches of mortgage-backed 
securities. Based on the logic of pooling and diversification, CDO 
managers were able to convince the ratings agencies that a basket of low-
rated mortgage-backed security tranches (say, rated BBB each) could 
deserve an AA rating once combined together.24 But the scale of mortgage 
defaults eventually overwhelmed the supposed diversification of these 
CDOs. In the meantime, investors had piled on even more leverage 
through instruments known as synthetic CDOs. Synthetic CDOs did not 
contain any actual mortgage-backed securities, but were paper bets on the 
performance of other mortgage-backed securities. Essentially, they were 
bets on whether the borrowers would pay their mortgages.25 This meant 
that when borrowers defaulted en masse, more investors had something to 
lose—all the more so because the same mortgage-backed securities were 
referenced again and again in many different synthetic CDOs.26 Finally, 
the most destructive element of the CDO machine was the use of credit 
default swaps (CDS). CDSs were insurance-like contracts that promised to 
pay investors if the reference security, typically a particular tranche of a 
CDO, were to default. This insurance-like feature made CDOs more 
attractive to purchase. But whereas regulated insurance companies must 
set aside a reserve to pay claims, credit default swaps went unregulated and 
their issuers (in particular, AIG) were unprepared to pay out claims on the 
massive scale that became necessary.27 Synthetic CDOs and credit default 
swaps can both be seen as ways of piling more risk onto the mortgage 
 
22. Vulnerabilities Associated with Leveraged Loans and Collateralised Loan 
Obligations, FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
P191219.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ36-M5HK].  
23. It is estimated that “more than 80% of US CLOs have exposures to the top five 
borrowers.” Id. 
24. Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States,” 127-29 GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7B5-
W8PP]. 
25. Id. at 142. 
26. Id. at 145. 
27. Id. at 140-41. 
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lending system, that is, above and beyond the default risk of mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs themselves. 
The growth of CLOs has mirrored the cautionary tale of CDOs in 
several respects, but CLOs are widely considered to pose a lesser threat to 
the financial system.28 Consider the differences between CLOs and CDOs. 
First, the CLO market is not yet as large as the mortgage-backed security 
or CDO markets were before the crisis.29 Second, CLOs typically hold 
corporate loans diversified across many industries, meaning that defaults 
would need to be pervasive across the economy in order for CLOs 
themselves to fail. At that level of business default, CLOs might be the 
least of the macroeconomic problems. Third, while CDOs were two layers 
of financial engineering removed from the underlying mortgages (that is, 
mortgage to mortgage-backed security to CDO), CLOs are only one layer 
removed from the underlying corporate loans. This difference means less 
opportunity to amplify risk by repackaging the same loans into multiple 
synthetic products. Fourth, the use of credit default swaps peaked in 2007 
and the notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts has plummeted to 
just 15% of the pre-crisis high.30 And while credit default swaps written 
against corporate loans (known as Collateralized Synthetic Obligations, or 
CSOs) have been rising since 2014, post-crisis CDS are thought to be safer 
because (a) ratings agencies no longer rate these instruments and (b) banks 
no longer hold them on their balance sheets. “Post-crisis bank regulations 
have either prohibited or made uneconomic the ownership, trading, and 
warehouse financing of CSO risk.”31 Nonetheless, a recent report by 
Guggenheim Investments concludes that while CSOs do not yet appear as 
dangerous as the credit default swaps that amplified the financial crisis, 
their basic structure similarly “reflects the procyclical nature of synthetic 
financial products.”32 The nature of these products is to amplify losses, and 
so any string of loan defaults would be exacerbated by CSOs. 
 
28. See, e.g., Michael R. Roberts & Michael Schwert, Why CLOs Will Not Cause the 
Next Financial Crisis, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/clos-will-not-cause-next-financial-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/654V-9YCQ]; CLOs Are Not CDOs: Why They Likely Aren’t a Major Risk to 
Banks, CHARLES SCHWAB INVESTMENT MGMT. (Jun. 29, 2020), 
https://www.schwabfunds.com/content/clos-are-not-cdos-why-they-arent-likely-to-topple-
banking-system [https://perma.cc/V8JM-WGBY]. 
29. One estimate puts the CLO market at $675 billion in 2020, while mortgage-backed 
security market was $1.3 trillion in 2007. Yves Smith, Wall Street’s Useful Idiot: Financial Times 
Shills for CLOs . . . as Fed Hasn’t Bailed Them Out, NAKED CAPITALISM (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2020/05/wall-streets-useful-idiot-financial-times-shills-for-clos-
as-fed-hasnt-bailed-them-out.html [https://perma.cc/4JR3-GHS5]. 
30. The Rise of Collateralized Synthetic Obligations: Beware the Rhyme of History, 
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The most important similarity between CDOs and CLOs may be that 
in both cases, by securitizing loans, the original lender does not remain on 
the hook for default risk, and therefore has less reason to be cautious when 
making the loan in the first place. Histories of the financial crisis have 
termed this the “originate to distribute” model of mortgage lending, and 
the same phenomenon has taken hold in corporate lending. “In the mid-
1990s, U.S. and foreign banks funded more than 70 percent of institutional 
leveraged loans. By the first half of 2019, they funded less than 11 
percent.”33 Large banks still arrange 93% of those leveraged loans, but 
they pass on the risk to other investors through CLOs.34 From one 
perspective, this may be good news for financial system stability, since 
bank failures are regulators’ greatest fear, at least in the Dodd-Frank 
regulatory paradigm. But from a different perspective, one should fear the 
proliferation of poor-quality loans as banks maximize their origination fees 
and then hand off the risk to other investors.35 It may be that leveraged 
loans and CLOs do not pose a systemic risk to banks but do augur danger 
ahead for borrower companies. The 2008 analogy would be that even if 
credit default swaps had not crippled AIG and Lehman, the underlying 
aggressive lending would still have produced the mortgage crisis that 
pushed millions of people out of their homes. 
B. The Risk of Deflationary Deleveraging 
Indeed, even absent a financial crisis, a credit boom followed by a 
deflationary deleveraging period is a serious macroeconomic threat that 
our economic policies should seek to avoid. Excessive corporate debt could 
exacerbate a recession caused at least in part by other factors. This was the 
view of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, which wrote in late 
2019 that, “[h]igh levels of corporate debt likely won’t cause an economic 
downturn, but they may accelerate one as highly leveraged companies fail, 
forcing layoffs, decreasing aggregate demand and creating a downward 
spiral of bankruptcies and further layoffs.”36  Similarly, in its latest report 
 
33. Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., Leveraged Lending and Corporate Borrowing: 
Increased Reliance on Capital Markets, with Important Bank Links, 13 FDIC Q. No. 4, at 45 
(2019). 
34. Id. at 46. 
35. Even after securitizing such loans, banks are typically still exposed to borrower 
companies by way of revolving credit lines, which might come under more pressure if the 
borrowers struggle with debt service on the leveraged loans. Evidence from the financial crisis 
shows that concentrated drawdowns on these credit lines can result in credit crunches for banks. 
Adonis Antoniades, Liquidity Risk and the Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: Evidence from Micro-
Level Data on Mortgage Loan Applications (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 473, 
2014). 
36. JOINT ECON. COMM. 116TH CONG., THE RISK OF RISING CORPORATE DEBT 
(Comm. Print 2019), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4925780d-4177-448d-afc0-
d24e1cfe8019/background-on-corporate-debt-10.2.19-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WHE-J7FN]. 
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on global financial stability, the International Monetary Fund warned that 
while “vulnerabilities in the world’s households” were much lower than at 
the time of the financial crisis, corporate debt would “amplify” any 
economic downturn through bankruptcies and defaults.37 This concern 
does not just apply to uniquely risky securitization structures like the 
collateralized loan obligations discussed above, but more broadly to the 
complete universes of corporate debt. From that wide-angle view, the 
concerning trend is the higher share of “junk” or high-yield bonds (relative 
to investment grade) issued in recent years relative to the previous two 
economic booms.38 As of 2019, investment-grade companies made up only 
43% of issuers, although they issue more debt per capita than high yield 
issuers.39 The most common rating among outstanding bonds was BBB 
(the lowest tier of investment grade), at 40.8% of the total. This means that 
a large portion of corporate debt was perched on the precipice of falling 
into the “junk” category. If these ratings are accurate, they suggest a large 
universe of corporate borrowers that might be unable to make interest 
payments if overall economic conditions worsened; or, that by prioritizing 
interest payments, might cut back on other spending and worsen a 
recession. In the worst-case scenario, problems servicing corporate debt 
could cause (or exacerbate) an economic crisis in which debt-to-income 
ratios rise at the same time that economic activity falls.40 Businesses might 
implement their version of austerity and cut spending, which would be 
disastrous for employment. Macro investing guru Ray Dalio refers to this 
set of circumstances as an “ugly deflationary deleveraging.” Examples 
include the U.S. Great Depression from 1930-1932, Japan from 1990 to the 
present, and the U.S. from July 2008 to February 2009 (prior to the start of 
quantitative easing).41 
C. The Benefits of Corporate Debt Do Not Outweigh the Risks at the 
Current Level 
After listing this litany of dangers associated with excessive leverage, 
it is important to consider the benefits of corporate debt and ask whether 
those benefits might outweigh the potential harms. It goes without saying 
that firms take on debt because they expect it to help (e.g. to help finance 
 
37. Chris Giles, Corporate Debt Levels Risk Amplifying Economic Fragility, Says IMF, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/9be23506-5b64-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a 
[https://perma.cc/43X6-U76U]. 
38. Akrur Barua & Patricia Buckley, Mounting Corporate Debt and the Risks Ahead, 
DELOITTE RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Jun. 3, 2019), https://deloitte.wsj.com/ 
riskandcompliance/2019/06/03/mounting-corporate-debt-and-the-risks-ahead/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RG7-RP66]. 
39. U.S. Corporate Debt Market, supra note 16. 
40. Ray Dalio, An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings, BRIDGEWATER ASSOCIATES (Feb. 
2012), https://alapblog.hu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/an-in-depth-look-at-deleveragings--ray-
dalio-bridgewater.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N7L-XA5T]. 
41. Id. at 4. 
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investments, or to take advantage of low interest rates and funnel the 
proceeds to shareholders). In light of the centrality of debt to corporate 
financial practices, I make no claim that debt is categorically harmful. 
Instead, my claim is only that at recent levels, the risks of taking out a 
marginal dollar of debt have probably exceeded the benefits, from a public 
policy perspective. That claim contains three important qualifications that 
deserve explanation: first, we are evaluating the marginal dollar of debt, 
not all debt; second, we are concerned with the benefits and harms of debt 
to the public, not only to a firm or its shareholders; and third, my evaluation 
cannot go further than “probable” because there is no consensus on the 
socially optimal level of aggregate corporate borrowing. 
It is important to distinguish between the benefits of firms being able 
to take on some debt and the benefits of debt at the margin. There is no 
doubt that debt financing has been and will continue to be very important 
to American businesses. The importance of debt should be noted against 
the background fact that internal financing (that is, financing from retained 
earnings) makes up the majority of real investment.42 But within the 
category of external financing, debt predominates over equity, at least on 
net. In many recent years, net stock issuance has been negative (that is, 
more shares are subsumed in acquisitions and buybacks than created).43 As 
noted above, in 2019 there was over $9 trillion in corporate debt 
outstanding. Debt financing is not going anywhere. The pertinent question 
is whether, given current debt levels, federal policy should encourage or 
discourage the marginal loan. In the preceding sections, I have presented 
evidence attesting that the level of debt reached in the long recovery from 
the 2008 financial crisis has reached a dangerous level. If one agrees with 
that analysis, it follows that any policy meant to solve the problem need 
not act to discourage debt under all circumstances, but only when some 
threshold is reached (whether indexed to macroeconomic or individual 
firm-level conditions). Indeed, my proposal for a modified corporate 
interest deduction in Part IV would not discourage all debt, but only debt 
taken on above a target debt-equity ratio.44 
A substantial literature examines the circumstances under which 
taking on debt is beneficial for firms.45 This literature operates against the 
backdrop of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which states that the choice 
between debt and equity has no effect on the value of the firm, assuming 
 
42. See Stewart C. Myers, Capital Structure, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 81, 82 (2001). 
43. Id. at 82; see also J.W. Mason, Acquisitions as Corporate Money Hose, J.W. MASON 
BLOG (Sep. 26, 2018), https://jwmason.org/slackwire/acquisitions-as-corporate-money-hose/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4C4-YEKC] (noting that “net equity issued by US corporations average[ed] 
around negative 2 percent of GDP” between 1998 and 2018). 
44. See Section IV.E infra. 
45. For a review, see Myers supra note 42. 
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frictionless financial markets.46 In reality, the “imperfections” (or, more 
accurately, legal and social realities) of financial markets have led scholars 
to observe three primary reasons why firms might prefer raising debt to 
equity, at least under certain conditions. Before examining each reason, it 
is crucial to note that all three represent theories of why debt is beneficial 
from the perspective of managers and/or shareholders. Without further 
analysis, there is no reason to assume that the benefits of debt for 
shareholders equate to benefits for the public. They might instead 
represent transfers from managers to shareholders, or transfers from the 
public itself. Alternatively, taking on extra debt might lead to positive-sum 
outcomes for both private and public parties. I will therefore inspect each 
theory of why firms take on debt and ask whether it suggests a policy 
rationale for encouraging more debt on the margin. 
The following three theories are not mutually exclusive; empirical 
work has produced results consistent with each.47 The first reason that debt 
is sometimes considered superior to equity is the fact that interest 
payments on corporate debt are tax-deductible. This feature is known as 
debt’s “tax shield” in the corporate finance literature. Explaining exactly 
how the tax shield leads firms to favor debt is the purpose of Part III, 
below. For now, the key point is that while the tax shield may or may not 
be justified as a policy choice (I argue that it is not, see Section III.B), the 
fact that firms save money on their taxes is not an independent reason for 
public policy to encourage more debt. This benefit falls strictly in the 
category of private benefits; from the public’s perspective, it should 
probably be viewed as a cost, as the public fisc subsidizes the use of debt. 
The second theory, known as the “pecking order theory,” is rooted in 
the logical inferences that investors may make about managers’ decisions 
to issue particular securities. The core idea is that managers who think the 
market undervalues the firm will issue debt, while managers who think the 
firm is overvalued will issue shares (or at least investors will interpret the 
decision to issue shares in this way).48 The intuition is that an optimistic 
manager will choose debt because, after paying the fixed interest costs, 
 
46. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and 
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). The intuition connecting “frictionless 
capital markets” to this result is that if some investors were willing to pay extra for the securities 
of a firm with an “optimal” debt ratio (different from the firm’s actual existing ratio), the firm 
would just issue those securities (whether more debt or more equity) until the optimal ratio was 
met. “Thus, the supply of debt adjusts until the value added for the marginal investor is essentially 
zero.” Myers supra note 42, at 86. 
47. See, e.g., Carmen Cotei & Joseph B. Farhat, The Trade-off Theory and the Pecking 
Order Theory: Are They Mutually Exclusive? (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper 
1404576, 2009); Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder & Stewart C. Myers, Testing Static Tradeoff Against 
Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 219 (1999). 
48. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 
(1984). 
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existing shareholders will get to claim all the upside from the firm’s growth 
(and managers are assumed to be working for the benefit of existing 
shareholders). Empirically, announcements of stock issuance tend to drive 
down share price.49 The pecking order theory is fundamentally about 
investor confidence, but it is more that investors grow less confident when 
the firm raises equity rather than that they grow more confident when the 
firm raises debt. Proponents of the pecking order theory are clear that 
investing with retained earnings should be preferred most of all.50 
Following the logic of the theory, if lawmakers were to make debt more 
expensive (e.g. through the tax code), firms would raise marginally more 
equity and at lower share prices. This would be bad for pre-existing 
shareholders and good for new shareholders. The only way this could be 
macroeconomically problematic would be if firms were unable to raise 
enough capital for their investments due to the lowered share prices. But 
this would be an extreme outcome relative to the status quo, where net 
equity issuance is negative (that is, firms raise more than their investments 
require from retained earnings and debt). Otherwise, the theory merely 
predicts that more equity issuance will depress the value of existing equity 
holdings. It is difficult to interpret the pecking order theory as a reason for 
why the government should keep debt cheap. 
The third theory holds that debt is superior for existing shareholders 
because interest payments force discipline on managers, preventing them 
from indulging in over-investment, and/or forcing them to sell off under-
utilized assets. This is known as the “free cash flow” theory, and is often 
cited as the motivating force behind the leveraged buyout boom of the 
1980s.51 This story of debt’s appeal probably does not hold for all or even 
most firms; in general, investors view capital investments as good news, so 
the allegation of over-investment must only apply to a subset of firms.52 
Even for those where the theory holds, it is not clear that disciplining 
managers for the benefit of shareholders is necessarily in the interest of 
public policy. So-called overinvestment, even if unprofitable, builds up 
capital stock that successor firms can use productively, even if it does not 
benefit the current firm’s shareholders. Moreover, overinvestment creates 
jobs and stimulates economic activity. This appears to be a case where, 
even if debt serves the interests of current shareholders, it probably does 
not serve the societal interest at large. 
 
49. Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. 
ECON. 61 (1986). 
50. Myers supra note 42, at 92. 
51. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
52. John J. McConnell & Chris Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions 
and the Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (1985). 
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Drawing out these distinctions between the reasons for managers to 
choose debt and reasons for the government to subsidize debt should make 
clear why the literature on optimal capital structure is not much help in 
determining whether firms currently have too much or too little debt from 
a policy perspective. That literature seeks to empirically model the 
relationship between leverage and market value in order to estimate the 
“optimal” capital structure for specific firms and industries.53 But as the 
preceding paragraphs demonstrate, a measure of optimality based in stock 
market values does not adequately capture the considerations relevant to 
public policy. This is both because the benefits of leverage are measured 
from shareholders’ perspective and because the costs are limited to those 
internalized within the firm. But financial distress also harms a firm’s 
customers and suppliers.54 Employees are harmed by the prospect of 
unemployment brought on by distress or bankruptcy. And, of course, there 
are the risks to the financial system and the growth rate discussed in 
Sections I.A and I.B above. 
*        *        * 
The prevailing high corporate debt levels seem a risk to be taken 
seriously, even if that level of debt is rational from shareholders’ 
perspective. U.S. policymakers should question a legal environment that 
allows and indeed encourages corporate borrowers to take on such high 
levels of debt. At the same time, that environment may help explain why, 
as financial markets began to plummet in March 2020, Congress and the 
Federal Reserve understood the risk of default and turned first to backstop 
corporate debt. 
II. The Fed’s Debt Market Interventions 
In late March 2020, the Federal Reserve announced several lending 
facilities to support the money market, the asset-backed securities market, 
the commercial paper market, and the corporate debt market. A few days 
later, Congress blessed the corporate debt program by allocating several 
hundred billion dollars to serve as an equity cushion for the Fed’s 
unprecedented corporate lending.  Specifically, Section 4003 of the 
CARES Act appropriated $500 billion to the Department of Treasury’s 
Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) in order to make loans, loan 
guarantees, and other investments in eligible business and government 
entities.55 In total, the corporate lending facilities could support up to $1.45 
trillion in lending, or approximately 15% of the total U.S. corporate debt 
market. The total could grow even larger if the Treasury were to allocate 
 
53. See, e.g., Arthur Korteweg, The Net Benefits to Leverage, 65 J. FIN. 2137 (2010). 
54. See Sheridan Titman & Roberto Wessels, The Determinants of Capital Structure 
Choice, 43 J. FIN. 1 (1988). 
55. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 
281 (2020). 
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the yet-unused half of its ESF funds to the cause. In this Part, I will make 
three main points. First, these lending facilities began to “work” even 
before they disbursed any money. Second, corporate finance theory 
suggests that the existence of these programs—and belief that the Fed 
would do something similar in the next crisis—will probably have a long-
lasting impact on firms’ cost of debt capital. Third, and related, while 
Congress and the Fed did not act with any intent to reduce the cost of debt 
capital relative to equity capital, this will be the result. 
A. The Fed’s Programs Had an Immediate Effect—Before Any Money 
Went Out the Door 
By early April 2020, even before the Fed expanded its corporate 
credit facilities to cover high-yield debt, investment-grade borrowing 
reached record levels relative to the same point in prior years.56 And once 
the Fed softened its eligibility criteria, more junk bonds were issued than 
in any month over the prior three years.57 The secondary market shared in 
the optimism: two popular high-yield ETFs enjoyed more than $6 billion 
in inflows over the month of April.58 An index that tracks “fallen angels,” 
or corporate bonds recently downgraded from corporate to junk status, 
rose sharply on the Fed’s announcements, up 6.3% since the Fed’s April 
8th announcement and 25.8% since original announcement of the corporate 
credit facilities on March 23rd.59 Credit spreads, which had reached a peak 
in mid-March, declined after the Fed’s announcements. Approximately 
half of the credit spread changes upon the Fed’s March 23rd 
announcement can be attributed to decreased default risk.60 At Berkshire 
Hathaway’s annual shareholder meeting on May 2nd, Warren Buffett 
remarked, “Every one of those people that issued bonds in late March and 
April ought to send a thank-you letter to the Fed.”61 
 
56. Joy Wiltermuth, How the Fed’s Historic Leap into Buying Corporate Debt is 
Working Even Before the Purchases Formally Start, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 3, 2020),  
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-feds-historic-leap-into-buying-corporate-debt-is-
working-even-before-the-purchases-formally-start-2020-04-03 [https://perma.cc/DUM4-G8JG]. 
57. Joe Rennison & Eric Platt, Junk Bonds Fly off the Shelves After Federal Reserve 
Boost, FIN. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/bf954b18-302f-4c97-94a7-
fc3f0b2a76f9 [https://perma.cc/L2UJ-6DML]. 
58. Id. 
59. iShares Fallen Angels USD Bond ETF, MARKETWATCH, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/faln [https://perma.cc/LGR9-GXGS]. 
60. Yoshio Nozawa & Yancheng Qiu, The Corporate Bond Market Reaction to 
Quantitative Easing During the COVID-19 Pandemic, J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2021). 
61. Antoine Gara & Nathan Vardi, Inside the $2.5 Trillion Debt Binge That Has Taken 
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And yet, all of this activity took place before the Fed bought a single 
corporate bond or ETF share.62 The immediate payoff from the Fed’s 
announcements suggests that bond investors mainly needed the confidence 
that the Fed was prepared to stand behind the market, more than its actual 
participation. This makes sense if one understands the Fed as alleviating a 
certain portion of interest rate risk associated with the possibility of sudden 
downgrades or defaults for the companies worst affected by the COVID-
19 crisis. A group of researchers associated with the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago hypothesize that “the main factor driving the reaction to the 
announcements might be the elimination of “disaster risk” for eligible 
issuers, that is, the drastic reduction in the likelihood of an abrupt credit 
crunch, at least in the near term.”63 In other words, the Fed has at least 
partially assumed the portion of each firm’s credit risk that is attributable 
to major macroeconomic shocks. With the Fed’s assurance behind them, 
private financiers were willing to step in and resume lending. And when 
bond yields begin to spike upon news of the next financial crisis, investors 
will expect the Fed to swoop in and purchase ETF shares and bond 
participations, and to make new loans available. Following the example of 
the current crisis, yields might not even spike very much in the first place 
given investors’ new understanding that the Fed would act if they did. 
B. The Fed’s New Precedent Will Likely Have a Long-Term Effect on 
Interest Rates 
Research in corporate finance validates the notion that the looming 
presence of a government guarantee reduces the cost of debt in normal 
times. Until recently, this benefit was thought to apply uniquely to large 
banks, which enjoy a widely acknowledged “too big to fail” guarantee. 
Empirical work finds that credit spreads for large banks are relatively 
insensitive to changes in those banks’ risk profiles, indicating that creditors 
do not take the risk of bank failure seriously.64 These effects are enduring. 
 
62. The first ETF purchases began on May 12th, with bond purchases promised to follow 
soon after. Jeanna Smialek, Fed Makes Initial Purchases in Its First Corporate Debt Buying 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/business/ 
economy/fed-corporate-debt-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/KQQ5-9L5H]. It is worth noting 
that corporate issuers may have been simultaneously influenced by the European Central Bank, 
which announced its own corporate lending program several days prior to the Fed and later agreed 
to accept “fallen angel” bonds as well. Martin Arnold, ECB to Launch €750bn Bond-Buying 
Programme, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/711c5df2-695e-11ea-800d-
da70cff6e4d3 [https://perma.cc/3HMC-855G]. 
63. Stefania D’Amico et al., Impacts of the Fed Corporate Credit Facilities Through the 
Lenses of ETFs and CDX 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank Chi., Working Paper No. 2020-14, 2020), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3605723 [https://perma.cc/8TEH-7DH6]. 
64. Viral Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit 
Government Guarantees (MPRA, Paper No. 79700, 2016), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/79700/1/MPRA_paper_79700.pdf [https://perma.cc/S67S-3GRG]. This subsidy has 
been estimated at between 22 and 100 basis points. See P. Gandhi & H. Lustig, Size Anomalies in 
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They exist so long as investors believe the government guarantee hangs in 
the background as a possibility. In the aftermath of the 2020 economic 
crisis, it will be difficult to convince investors otherwise. The Fed has 
revealed a powerful new tool in its arsenal, and without an act of Congress 
it would be impossible to make a credible commitment that the Fed will 
not use it again. 
Up to this point, I have referred to government ‘backstops,’ 
‘guarantees,’ and ‘bailouts’ somewhat interchangeably. But the form in 
which the government supports distressed companies might matter, both 
in the short term for defining exactly which investors are rescued, and in 
the long term for incorporating the expectations of government support 
into the prices of particular securities. Some options include purchasing the 
company’s assets at an above-market price, setting a price floor for public 
offerings of the company’s stock, or buying that stock directly. The Bank 
of Japan has purchased Japanese equities (via ETFs) since 2010 in an effort 
to raise stock prices. Although the counterfactual is unknowable, the 
program does not appear to have been successful, as the price-to-earnings 
ratio of Japanese stocks only declined over that period.65 One reason 
central bank equity purchases may not have the intended effect is that 
investors may be wary that the government will eventually liquidate its 
enormous position, driving prices back down. Bonds, on the other hand, 
mature over time, so there is no need for government-scale selloffs. 
Over the longer term, both debt and equity benefit from banks’ too-
big-to-fail status, and it is an empirical question which group benefits 
more.66 With respect to the stimulus efforts of March and April 2020, it is 
too soon to tell exactly how the corporate lending programs will factor into 
the long-run prices of debt and equity. One should expect the Fed’s lending 
programs to boost equity prices insofar as reduced bankruptcy risk limits 
the downside potential for shareholders. But even as all capital holders 
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benefit, there is reason to believe that the benefits will accrue 
disproportionately to debt. First, evidence from the 2008 Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) suggests that the gains from bailouts go primarily 
to debt, even though that program offered aid at various levels of the 
capital structure—mostly preferred and common stock, as well as 
commands to raise private capital.67 In light of these various forms of 
intervention, it is striking that the market value of bank debt increased by 
$119 billion in response to the TARP announcement while the market 
value of bank equity dropped by $2.8 billion.68 Second, the 2020 programs 
were targeted at debt instruments that are particularly sensitive to the 
possibility of default. Credit risk accounts for a larger fraction of the yield 
spread on high-yield bonds than on investment grade bonds.69 By including 
high-yield bonds in its target universe, the Fed made a bigger contribution 
to reducing credit risk and thereby driving down spreads than if it had 
limited the program to investment grade bonds alone. Third, the financial 
media have reported that traditional stock investors started moving into 
bonds after the Fed’s announcement.70 If the benefits of bond-buying 
programs were expected to be shared equally across the capital structure, 
we would not observe this phenomenon. 
C. The Fed Is Not Comfortable Holding Equity 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that there is no evidence that Congress 
or the Fed chose to support corporate debt, rather than take equity in 
struggling firms, out of a desire to bring about any of the capital structure-
related consequences that this Section has predicted. In theory, an 
alternative path to achieving capital structure neutrality from the one 
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pursued in this Note would be for the Fed or Treasury to support struggling 
companies by buying equity. That approach might bring its own virtues, 
especially for those who favor the federal government pursuing industrial 
policy as an active shareholder.71 But without significant institutional 
innovation (for example, the formation of a national development bank, as 
Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova propose), that approach is unlikely 
because it is inconsistent with the Fed’s culture and current political role. 
To that point, the most likely reasons for choosing to purchase debt 
have to do with the Fed’s institutional comfort zone. First, the corporate 
debt facilities might be seen as just a few steps removed from the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which the Fed operated from 
2008 to 2010 and which represented the first time in modern history that 
non-financial firms could borrow at the Fed’s discount window.72 The 
CPFF stood as an institutional precedent that might have reassured Fed 
staff about the prospect of lending to non-financial firms on a greater scale. 
Second, there is every indication that the federal government does not 
want to hold securities in private companies any longer than necessary. 
New loans issued under the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
have a maximum term of four years; loans issued under the Main Street 
facilities have a maximum term of five years; and bonds purchased under 
the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility can have a remaining 
maturity of up to five years.73 Corporate equities do not come with a fixed 
term, and so the Fed would need to actively decide when to sell any equities 
it purchased back to the market. But Fed officials would presumably worry 
about such sales upsetting market prices—as mentioned above, some 
observers suspect that the Bank of Japan’s stock purchases have failed to 
raise prices for just this reason. Third, by every indication, the federal 
government does not want to exercise governance rights in private 
companies unless absolutely necessary.74 This militates against purchasing 
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CORP. L. 409 (2010); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory 
and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). 
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any instrument with voting rights, such as common stock. The Fed could 
theoretically participate in a private issuance of a special class of equity 
shares lacking voting rights, but this would require coordinating with each 
potential issuer and would block the possibility of making secondary 
market purchases (given that many issuers will not have such non-voting 
shares already circulating on the market). While Fed officials will likely 
experience some institutional discomfort holding such a large portfolio of 
corporate debt and ETF shares for the first time, these considerations 
suggest that holding an equivalent portfolio of equity would have been 
anathema. 
In the following Parts, I proceed under the assumption that the Fed’s 
corporate lending programs will reduce the cost of debt relative to equity. 
But even if this were not the case, and the programs instead reduced the 
cost of capital equivalently, it would still be troubling from the perspective 
developed in Part I—that is, that firms are currently overly leveraged. 
From that perspective, public policy should find opportunities to 
discourage leverage. We now turn to the corporate tax, the most significant 
policy to do just the opposite. 
III. Leverage and the Corporate Interest Deduction 
In this Part, I will examine the logic and consequences of the interest 
deduction as they stood before the Fed’s recent actions. First, I will show 
that the interest deduction creates an incentive for firms to choose debt 
over equity, although this fact is not as simple or self-evident as 
commentators often treat it. Second, I will show that the traditional 
defense of the interest deduction as necessary to accurately reflect 
corporate income is unpersuasive. Third, I will review the strongest 
affirmative arguments against the interest deduction from the tax 
literature. And while many of those arguments treat neutrality between 
debt and equity as something to be achieved inside the tax law, I argue that 
achieving complete capital structure neutrality requires looking between 
the tax law and other areas of policy. 
A. The Corporate Tax Has Historically Favored Debt and Still Does for 
the Majority of Investors 
Prior to any of the debt market interventions of 2020, federal tax law 
tended to encourage the use of debt over equity in corporate finance. The 
exact (tax-related) favorability of debt in relation to equity is the product 
of several factors. The first factor is the interest deduction. Corporations 
may deduct interest payments on their debt, but may not deduct dividend 
payments on their equity. Early 20th century versions of the corporate tax 
included caps on the interest deduction, motivated by similar concerns 
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about excess leverage as commentators raise today.75 In 2017, the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act (TCJA) returned to some of those early 20th century roots 
and instituted a cap on interest deductibility. Corporations may now 
deduct interest payments up to the sum of 30% of adjusted taxable income 
and any business interest income.76 Business interest not allowed as a 
deduction may be carried forward to the next year (where the 30% cap 
remains in force).77 In 2020, the CARES Act temporarily increased the 
deduction cap to 50% of adjusted taxable income.78 
But the deductibility of interest is not the only tax factor that 
determines the relative costs of debt and equity. Tax rates matter, as does 
the time value of money. A classic way to illustrate the options is to imagine 
an investor seeking to invest in a business venture. She can invest in four 
ways: (1) as an individual investment (that is, such that her personal tax 
rate will apply to business income), (2) in the form of debt, (3) in the form 
of equity with annual dividends, or (4) in the form of equity with retained 
earnings but no dividends. For simplicity, it is assumed that the interest 
rate on debt is the same as the dividend rate, and that the investments run 
for the same amount of time, at the end of which the investor in the fourth 
scenario has her stock redeemed at the capital gains rate. The payoffs in 
these scenarios depend on the extra layer of taxation for corporate equity; 
the differences in rates among the personal rate, the corporate rate, the 
dividend rate, and the capital gains rate; and the deferral of the 
shareholder’s tax in the fourth scenario.79 Under current rates, corporate 
equity with retained earnings is the superior option for taxable investors, 
while equity with dividends and debt are effectively tied.80 Yet, the history 
of the Code suggests that rates fluctuate more often than the interest 
deduction rule. If the corporate rate and/or the dividend rate were to be 
 
75. Those caps were lifted in 1918, primarily for the sake of offsetting the exclusion of 
debt from the definition of “invested capital” on top of which “excess profits” were to be measured 
for the wartime excess profits tax. It was considered unfair to exclude debt from invested capital, 
thereby handing corporations a larger excess profits bill, without at least letting them deduct 
interest payments. As Steven A. Bank argues, this history contradicts the notion that an interest 
deduction was part of the original design of the corporate tax. Steven A. Bank, Historical 
Perspective on the Corporate Interest Deduction, 18 CHAPMAN L. REV. 29, 40 (2014). 
76. 26 U.S.C. 163(j). “Adjusted taxable income” is a defined term of some complexity, 
but not relevant for the present discussion. For more, see Daniel M. Reach, Parsing the New 
Interest Expense Limitation in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/18mar/18mar-pp-
reach-parsing-the-new-interest-expense-limitation/ [https://perma.cc/AA6K-4L54]. 
77. 26 U.S.C. 163(j)(2). 
78. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2301, 
134 Stat. 281, 347 (2020). 
79. This analysis is drawn from Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual 
and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981). 
80. With a $100 investment, 10% interest rate, 10% dividend payout rate, 37% personal 
rate, 21% corporate rate, 20% qualified dividend and capital gains rate, and ten-year investment 
horizon, debt investment yields $184.22, equity with dividends yields $184.57, and equity with 
retained earnings yields $191.12. See id. 
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raised once again, debt would once again become the most tax-efficient 
option. 
This stylized analysis has so far assumed that corporate financing 
decisions are made strictly according to maximizing investors’ after-tax 
return, and that investors are taxable.81 In reality, one must account for the 
fact that three quarters of equity investors in U.S. public companies are not 
taxable.82 These non-taxable investors include pension funds, insurance 
companies, foreign residents, nonprofits, and individuals investing through 
IRAs. These investors get no benefit when corporations retain earnings, 
unless the corporation can reinvest those earnings at a higher rate of return 
than the market at large. But on the standard corporate finance assumption 
that above-market returns are not durable, these non-taxable investors 
would rather receive immediate payouts. To the extent that this majority 
of investors is able to influence firms’ dividend policy, the choice that 
managers realistically face is: raise equity and pay dividends, or issue debt 
and deduct interest payments. Managers have clear reason to favor the 
latter option. Deducting interest increases the firm’s after-tax earnings, 
leaving more money inside the firm for managers to spend.83 We should 
therefore expect managers to favor debt across tax rate regimes. Finally, 
the interest deduction creates an especially powerful reason for firms to 
prefer debt when the lender is tax-exempt. In this situation, interest 
payments are deductible for the borrower and not taxed to the lender; the 
result is that money escapes the economy entirely tax-free. The CBO has 
estimated that about 33% of interest payments made by corporations are 
received by tax-favored retirement plans and therefore never taxed.84 
Given the attractiveness of this situation for everyone involved (except the 
public fisc), we should expect tax-exempt lenders to offer lower interest 
rates and induce corporations to choose debt. 
B. Arguments Against the Interest Deduction 
 
81. In reality, managers have their own motivations for choosing one form of finance 
over the other. See generally Walter Novaes, Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in 
Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency, 76 J. BUS. 49 (2003). 
82. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share 
of U.S. Corporate Stock, TAX NOTES (May 16, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000790-The-Dwindling-Taxable-Share-of-U.S.-
Corporate-Stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SW5-X6LF]. 
83. See Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: 
Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distribution, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 
1231 (2010). 
84. Taxing Capital Income: Effective Marginal Tax Rates Under 2014 Law and Selected 
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Before proceeding to affirmative arguments against the interest 
deduction, it is important to see why the traditional case for the deduction 
does not hold water. That argument generally goes like this: interest 
payments are a cost of producing corporate income, and should be 
deducted like any other cost, such as wages paid to employees. But this 
statement begs the question; why are payments to creditors treated as a 
cost but payments to shareholders are not? As Alvin Warren showed many 
decades ago, how to treat interest payments depends on how one defines 
the boundaries of the corporation for the purposes of taxation.85 There are 
four options. First, the corporation could be defined as the aggregation of 
all parties participating in production. This would include workers, 
suppliers of material, and suppliers of capital. Corporate income would be 
defined as the aggregate receipts of that agglomeration, with no deductions 
permitted for payments between the members. Second, the corporation 
could be defined as corporate capital. Here, payments to managers, 
workers, and suppliers would be deducted, but payments to capital 
(whether debt or equity) would not. Third, the corporation could be 
defined as equity capital. Payments to workers, suppliers, and creditors 
would be deducted, but dividends paid to equity would not. And fourth, 
the corporation could be defined as what remains after payments are made 
to all participants, including equity capital. Here, a tax would be assessed 
only on undistributed earnings. Our familiar status quo corresponds to the 
third option. But it is not self-evident that this is the “right” way to define 
the firm.86 The appeal of the second and fourth options is that they 
recognize an equivalence between the forms of corporate capital, both of 
which involve an obligation on the part of the corporation to someone else 
(whether creditor or shareholder).87 
Beyond the fact that the interest deduction cannot be justified as a 
means of calculating a corporation’s net income, many tax scholars oppose 
 
85. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 
YALE L.J. 1585 (1974). 
86. Some might answer “income to shareholders” on the view that shareholders “own” 
the firm. There are two problems with this view. First, recent work in corporate theory 
convincingly demonstrates that shareholders do not own the firm or its assets. Second, even if 
shareholders did in some sense own the firm, it would not necessarily follow that they alone should 
bear the tax on corporate income. Corporations are different from individuals, and one should not 
unthinkingly generalize from one domain to the other. See generally David A. Ciepley, The 
Anglo-American Misconception of Stockholders As ‘Owners’ and ‘Members’: Its Origins and 
Consequences, 16 J. INSTITUTIONALIST ECON. 2020), 623; David A. Ciepley, Beyond Public and 
Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 
(2000). 
87. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction, at 1590. The fourth option would 
correspond to certain forms of “integration” that turn the corporate tax into a one-level tax, while 
the second option would retain the two-level tax and assess the second-level tax on all payments 
to capital, whether debt or equity. 
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it on prudential and policy grounds. 88 I will review the three main 
categories of critique: first, that the debt-equity distinction is untenable in 
practice; second, that the Code should be neutral between debt and equity; 
and third, that the Code’s debt bias is dangerous for macroeconomic and 
other reasons. 
First, while the interest deduction requires distinguishing between 
debt and equity, that distinction does not hold up in practice. Congress has 
provided only vague instructions for the hard task of distinguishing debt 
from equity, and courts have been left to work out the distinction on a case-
by-case basis.89 Scholars have criticized the resulting body of case law for 
its “convoluted mix of factors and inconsistent outcomes.”90 Further, 
financial engineers can design instruments with the telltale legal 
characteristics of debt but that will tend to bear the same risk and return 
as equity.91  Given that there is no clean line to be drawn between debt and 
equity, and that any attempt will be expensive to enforce, some 
commentators advocate for dropping the distinction entirely (whether by 
making interest includible or dividends deductible, options to be discussed 
at greater length below).92 
Next, some scholars argue that the Code should be neutral between 
debt and equity as a matter of efficiency and fairness. Herwig Schlunk 
defines this objective as “capital structure neutrality,” which is achieved 
when corporate managers cannot design capital structures that 
systematically alter the amount of taxes collected.93 Schlunk argues for 
capital structure neutrality on three grounds. First, the ability to reduce 
one’s taxes by manipulating capital structure reduces federal revenue. 
Second, the process of that manipulation involves various inefficiencies 
 
88. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 75, at 40 (2014); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate 
Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. REV. 410 (2000). 
89. See I.R.C. § 385. 
90. Benshalom, supra note 83, at 1236; see also David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, 
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1637-39 (1999) (criticizing 
the arbitrariness of the case law distinguishing debt from equity for tax purposes). 
91. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40 (dealing with a hybrid instrument known as 
adjustable rate convertible notes, or ARCNs, that paid interest and were set to redeem after a 
fixed term, but that would most likely convert into equity, depending on the price of common 
stock). For this reason, some commentators have suggested abandoning the multi-factor test and 
substituting a more objective financial analysis to determine whether the instrument bears risk 
like that of debt or equity. See Ted Gkoo, Finance Theory Meets Tax Law: How a Risk-Based 
Rule Can Rationalize the Debt Versus Equity Distinction, 9 CONTEMP. TAX J. 6 (2020). But even 
if that approach prevailed, distinguishing between debt and equity would remain an expensive, 
fiercely litigated matter. The battleground would shift from debating the multi-factor test to 
contesting experts’ calculation of beta, the financial risk factor, which observers of appraisal 
litigation know is rarely objective or easily-settled. See, e.g., Manichean Capital, LLC v. 
SourceHOV Holdings, Inc., 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 38, 2020 WL 496606 (Jan. 30, 2020) (noting that 
“the most consequential point of disagreement” concerned how to calculate beta). 
92. Joseph B. Allen, Seeking True Financial Reform: Ending the Debt-Equality 
Distinction, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243 (2012). 
93. Schlunk, supra note 88. 
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and transaction costs. Third, the absence of capital structure neutrality 
doesn’t only create a bias in favor of certain capital holders, it also creates 
a bias in favor of certain industries and business models. For example, 
businesses with volatile cash flows have more trouble issuing debt, which 
leaves them less able to take advantage of the interest deduction.94 But 
there is no evidence that Congress intended the interest deduction to have 
this effect. 
A third group of critics go beyond mere formal neutrality and make 
affirmative arguments that the Code’s debt bias is bad policy. The most 
common version of the anti-debt argument focuses on the economic 
downside—in the form of distress, bankruptcy, and possibly even financial 
crisis—of too much debt. This argument links the tax literature’s criticisms 
of the interest deduction with the non-tax literature’s warnings about the 
macroeconomic risks of debt, discussed in Part I. Nearly every critique of 
the debt-equity distinction mentions the risk of financial distress, although 
usually only in passing.95 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the focus 
on the link between taxation and financial distress rose to the fore.96 In 
particular, immediately after the 2008 crisis, most of the concern directed 
at over-leveraged firms was focused on banks. Accordingly, the most 
detailed treatment of how tax law can mitigate the macroeconomic risks of 
debt is Mark Roe and Michael Troge’s analysis of the interest deduction 
(and dividend inclusion) in the banking sector specifically.97 Roe and Troge 
signal their support for an economy-wide revamp of the interest deduction, 
but focus exclusively on banks for pragmatic reasons.98 Roe and Troge aim 
for capital structure neutrality. But they reject the idea of doing so by 
taxing interest income, for three reasons.99 First, they worry that ending the 
interest deduction would tax even unprofitable banks. But this would not 
be inconsistent with the normal operation of the tax law, which taxes 
 
94. Id. at 419. 
95. For example, Robert Pozen and Lucas Goodman opine, in a footnote, that the Code 
should not even be capital structure neutral, because “leverage is associated with negative 
externalities that suggest that, if anything, the tax code should favor equity over debt.” Robert C. 
Pozen & Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense, TAX 
NOTES 1214 n.44 (Dec. 10, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/01/Capping-the-Deductibility-of-Corporate-Interest-Expense.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3PC-
QGPV]. See also Benshalom, supra note 83 (noting that the Code’s treatment of debt may 
encourage excessive leverage and financial distress); Schlunk, supra note 88 (same); Allen, supra 
note 92 (same). 
96. Martin A. Sullivan, “Deleveraging the Tax Code,” Tax Notes, Sep. 29, 2008, available 
at http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/D6775BEF8915BFC0852574D6005759B 
D?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/4BDK-VSPA]. 
97. Mark J. Roe & Michael Troge, Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly, 
35 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (2018). 
98. Id. at 196. 
99. Id. at 198. 
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dividends even if the firm is unprofitable in the current period.100 Second, 
with no interest deduction, a bank’s tax would vary with interest rates. But 
if this is a problem, the taxable portion of interest payments could exempt 
the inflation rate, as they acknowledge. Third, Roe and Troge worry that 
ending the interest deduction only for banks could push debt elsewhere in 
the economy. And although the mechanism for such a dislocation is not 
explained, the implication of that argument would seem to be that the 
interest deduction should be reformed economy-wide, not just for the 
banking sector.101 
C. The Interest Deduction Looks Even More Indefensible in Light of 
Recent Events 
All of the above arguments for why the tax system should not favor 
debt have grown stronger in light of the Federal Reserve’s recent actions. 
As shown in Part II, the Fed has added a new source of debt bias to the 
policy landscape. Even if one believes that the tax system, on its own, is 
properly neutral between debt and equity, the totality of federal policy no 
longer is. To that point, it makes more sense to evaluate a goal like capital 
structure neutrality across the full sweep of federal policy than cabined 
within tax policy alone. Insofar as we recognize a goal of encouraging or 
discouraging a certain behavior (for example, corporate leverage), the 
total magnitude of legal incentive and disincentive should be measured in 
aggregate across areas of law. If one only opposed the deduction on the 
grounds that distinguishing between debt and equity thwarts efficient tax 
administration, I grant that one might not care how other areas of law treat 
debt. But my argument is stronger to the extent that one opposes the 
interest deduction for reasons that are not limited to tax administration, 
for example, the concerns about excessive leverage. Many of the tax 
scholars I have cited do care about those macroeconomic implications. 
Therefore, they should not be satisfied with “deleveraging the tax code” if 
it does not entail deleveraging federal policy on the whole.102 
IV. Limiting the Interest Deduction 
Once one is persuaded that the tax code should not incentivize 
corporate debt, the question becomes exactly how to equalize treatment of 
debt and equity (or even subsidize equity). In this Part, I consider several 
approaches for eliminating or modifying the corporate interest deduction. 
 
100. Dividends can arise out of either earnings and profits accumulated during the 
taxable year or those accumulated historically. I.R.C. § 316. 
101. Indeed, the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation expressed concern about 
the interest deduction’s role in bringing about distress at non-financial firms in 1989. See STAFF 
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FED. INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FIN. 
STRUCTURES JCS-1-89 (Joint Comm. Print 1989). 
102. Sullivan, supra note 96. 
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I begin by stating the case for why a permanent change to the tax code is 
the right way to pursue capital structure policy (as opposed to either a 
temporary change or a non-tax approach such as embedding debt 
restrictions in the Fed’s lending programs). I then summarize longstanding 
proposals for eliminating the interest deduction entirely and explain why 
these proposals have not been and probably will not be politically viable. 
This analysis suggests the need for a compromise position. To that end, I 
assess the modification made to the interest deduction in the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, and deem it a step in the right direction but ultimately 
lacking for several reasons. Finally, I propose a more targeted version of 
the modified interest deduction: one that allows the deduction only for 
firms with a global debt-equity ratio below a statutory target. 
A. Capital Structure Policy Is at Home in the Tax Code 
In this Part, I discuss eliminating or modifying the corporate interest 
deduction as a means of reducing the debt bias in federal capital structure 
policy. A preliminary question is why the tax code is the proper locus for 
this effort. Given that federal lending policy, as carried out under the 
CARES Act, is a major cause of the debt bias (as described in Part II), 
perhaps debt-equity limits should be housed within the Fed’s lending 
contracts. The CARES Act spells out a series of conditions that borrowers 
must meet: no dividends or buybacks for one year, maintenance of pre-
pandemic employment levels, and limits on executive compensation.103 
One could easily imagine adding limits on leverage to this list, akin to the 
debt restrictions found in private sector debt covenants. The gist of those 
covenants is that in exchange for credit, the company agrees to avoid doing 
various things that might hurt its capacity to pay back the loan.104 For the 
first time, the federal government is in a position to demand similar terms. 
And yet, as explained in Part II, the majority of firms that benefit from the 
Fed’s programs (through lower interest rates and through emboldened 
private sector lenders) will not receive anything from the Fed. Which is to 
say, they will never enter a relationship of privity with the federal 
government. The tax code is a better locus for encouraging all firms—
including, but not limited to, those that implicitly benefit from the Fed’s 
programs—to reduce their debt loads. Tax is the form of regulation that 
touches every firm. Even though the government cannot know in advance 
which firms will benefit from the Fed’s lending facilities, by building a 
target debt-equity ratio into the tax code, it can ensure that every firm 
nonetheless faces an incentive to maintain healthy balance sheets without 
 
103. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 
4003(c)(2)-(3), 134 Stat. 281, 347, 471 (2020). 
104. Rod Miller, Paul Denaro & Jessica Cunningham, Understanding High-Yield Bonds, 
PEI ALTERNATIVE INSIGHT & MILBANK LLP (2014), https://www.milbank.com/images/content/ 
1/7/17909/HYB-Milbank-digi.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FHL-FHKU].  
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too much debt. This is not to say that tax is the only valid policy tool for 
discouraging over-indebtedness; in the Conclusion, I sketch a preliminary 
vision of a coordinated capital structure policy across tax, bankruptcy, 
antitrust, and financial regulatory law. 
Some critics might argue that it would actually be better to limit the 
corporate interest deduction only during the rare episodes when the Fed 
intervenes to stabilize debt markets. After all, it seems that the Fed will 
only repeat the Spring 2020 playbook during particularly bad times. It 
might seem disproportionate to make a permanent change to the tax law 
in response to what is likely an intermittent form of countervailing lending 
policy. But, for three reasons, it makes sense for the restricted interest 
deduction (detailed below) to persist during “normal” economic times. 
First, as argued in Part II, the expectation of emergency federal lending 
will reduce private sector interest rates even during normal times, because 
a subset of the credit risk built into an interest rate reflects the risk of 
shocks to the entire economy (that is, the circumstances under which the 
Fed would intervene). Second, the height of an economic crisis is not the 
proper time to restrict deductions, so in fact boom years are the perfect 
time to do so. This point represents a form of argument common to law 
and macroeconomics, which is that public policy should impose relatively 
higher costs on the private sector during an economic boom and relatively 
lower costs during a recession.105 Third, while previously inconceivable, a 
bond-buying program like the present one will likely return during future 
recessions. One major reason the Fed has chosen to intervene this way is 
that the traditional monetary policy tools—that is, lowering interest 
rates—no longer work when the prevailing short-term rates are already at 
zero.106 If low rates continue on the horizon, as market observers seem to 
expect, the Fed and Treasury will need to return to the new direct lending 
toolkit in the next recession.107 
Given the likelihood that the government will provide various 
accommodations to corporate debtors during a crisis—direct lending 
support as well as temporary adjustments to the tax code108—it is all the 
more important that tax policy in “normal” times work to limit corporate 
debt in line with a healthy capital structure target. 
 
105. See, e.g., LISTOKIN, supra note 6, at 178-79 (discussing the case of utility regulation, 
arguing that utilities should impose relatively higher prices on consumers during economic booms 
so as to reduce prices and thereby boost consumer spending during a recession). 
106. Kenneth Rogoff, Dealing with Monetary Paralysis at the Zero Bound, 31 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 47 (2017). 
107. For example, the 10-year government bond rate has recently reached an all-time 
low. See Thomas Franck & Yun Li, 10-year Treasury Yield Hits New All-Time Low of 0.318% 
Amid Historic Flight to Bonds, CNBC MARKETS (Mar. 8, 2020),   https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/ 
09/10-year-treasury-yield-plunges.html [https://perma.cc/U55T-YQ4L]. 
108. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(j)(10), discussed below, as an example of a temporary 
accommodation to corporate debtors enacted during an economic crisis. 
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B. The Most Comprehensive Approach Is to Fully Eliminate the Interest 
Deduction 
For decades, tax scholars and Treasury officials have promulgated 
proposals for eliminating the interest deduction, so there is little mystery 
how it could be done. At a high level, the two general options are to include 
interest payments in corporate income or to deduct dividends from it. The 
federal government’s most comprehensive evaluation of these possibilities 
remains the Department of Treasury’s 1992 report on the “Integration of 
the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems.”109 Integration is a sort of holy 
grail of corporate tax policy, and is thought to serve many goals including, 
but not limited, to capital structure neutrality.110 The Treasury report 
detailed versions of both options named above: a “dividend exclusion” 
prototype and a “comprehensive business income tax” (CBIT) prototype, 
which the authors considered the “most comprehensive” of all the 
corporate tax reforms considered in the report.111 CBIT would subject both 
interest and dividend income to a single layer of tax assessed at the 
corporate level. But one need not go as far as CBIT to reduce the tax 
advantage of debt. Alternatively, one could simply eliminate the 
deductibility of interest while maintaining the two-level tax, and perhaps 
supplement this with various reforms to reduce the tax cost of equity, such 
as permitting a full 100% dividends received deduction for all 
intercorporate dividends.112 Evidence from other countries that have 
integrated their corporate tax systems validates the theory that integration 
reduces corporate debt-equity ratios by removing the tax advantage on 
debt.113 
C. Fully Eliminating the Interest Deduction Is Unlikely, so a Thoughtful 
Compromise Is Needed 
The reason to develop a complicated, partial interest deduction 
proposal, as I do below, is that it appears unlikely that Congress will pursue 
 
109. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Jan. 1992),  
https://www.treasury.gov/ resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdft 
[https://perma.cc/DD5K-WVLG]. 
110. The 1992 report named the objectives of achieving neutrality between the corporate 
and non-corporate sectors, neutrality between debt and equity, neutrality between retaining and 
distributing earnings, and taxing capital income exactly once in all cases. Id. at 13. 
111. Id. at 39.  
112. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE 
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2007), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Report-Improve-Competitiveness-2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39SF-EBP7]. 
113. Craig Schulman, Deborah Thomas, Keith Sellers & Duane Kennedy, Effects of Tax 
Integration and Capital Gains Tax on Corporate Leverage, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 31 (1996). 
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either of the comprehensive forms named above, at least not in a fashion 
that is desirable on the whole. The first comprehensive approach, 
corporate integration, has made little headway since the 1992 Treasury 
Report, at least in any form that would end the interest deduction. The 
most recent Congressional activity around corporate integration came in 
2016, when Senator Orrin Hatch was reported to be developing an 
integration proposal centered around a dividend deduction.114 That 
approach would equalize the tax treatment of debt and equity by allowing 
corporations to deduct payments to both; it would transform the corporate 
double tax into a single tax that exempts payments to capital. There is, of 
course, a long-running debate on the merits of the corporate double tax, 
and this is not the forum to rehash it.115 But for anyone committed to 
preserving the double tax, Hatch’s proposal is a non-starter qua tax policy, 
even if it has merit qua capital structure neutrality. To satisfy those who 
support the double tax, we must identify a proposal that eliminates the 
interest deduction. At first blush, recent tax plans advanced by 2016 
Presidential candidate Marco Rubio and the circa-2017 House 
Republicans (under the “Better Way” moniker) might seem to fit the bill. 
These plans proposed to eliminate the interest deduction.116 But in both 
plans, doing so went hand-in-hand with providing for immediate expensing 
(deduction) of all business investments. The logical relationship between 
these two policies is that, while some analysts believe that eliminating the 
interest deduction would discourage (debt-financed) investment, 
immediate expensing is thought to encourage investment (whether 
financed by debt or equity).117 When a business is allowed to immediately 
deduct the cost of its investments, it is equivalent to exempting all the 
returns from those investments. In other words, immediate expensing 
 




115. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate 
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995); Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the 
Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain 
Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613 (1990). 
116. Peter Eavis, House Tax Plan May Shift Use of Corporate Debt, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 
5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/dealbook/congress-tax-deductions-
corporate-trump.html [https://perma.cc/U85T-3R3E]; Elaine Maag, Roberton Williams, Jeff 
Rohaly & Jim Nunns, An Analysis of Marco Rubio’s Tax Plan, TAX POLICY CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000606-an-analysis-
of-marco-rubios-tax-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2VJ-9N2V]. 
117. See Erica York & Alex Muresianu, The TCJA’s Expensing Provision Alleviates the 
Tax Code’s Bias Against Certain Investments, TAX FOUND. (Sep. 5, 2018), 
https://taxfoundation.org/tcja-expensing-provision-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/5MFL-RDP9]. But 
see Steve Wamhoff & Richard Phillips, The Failure of Expensing and Other Depreciation Tax 
Breaks, INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON. POLICY (Nov. 19, 2018), https://itep.org/the-failure-of-
expensing-and-other-depreciation-tax-breaks/ [https://perma.cc/S485-4DUD] (arguing that 
expensing does not actually encourage investment). 
 
Coherent Capital Structure Policy 
1213 
neuters an income tax, turning it into a consumption tax.118 Again, there 
are serious debates as between income taxes and consumption taxes, but 
anyone who wants to preserve the longstanding income tax system would 
oppose the Rubio and Better Way proposals as not-so-subtle attempts to 
end the income tax under the guise of ending the interest deduction. 
As it turned out, Republican policymakers proved unwilling to go this 
far even when they held unified control of the government during the 115th 
Congress. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 provided for a partial version 
of immediate expensing: it increased the “bonus depreciation” percentage 
that businesses may claim for certain qualified property from 50% to 
100%, for property that is placed in service through 2022 (with bonus 
depreciation phased down in the subsequent years).119 In a weak nod to the 
interrelationship between depreciation and the interest deduction, the Act 
also limited the deductibility of interest, as discussed below (“weak” in that 
the Act provided for complete, if temporary, expensing without completely 
eliminating the interest deduction). If Congressional Republicans chose 
not to eliminate the interest deduction under these circumstances—unified 
control, ability to pair it with a powerful expensing provision—when would 
they actually do so? Reading between the lines, it seems that the business 
interests behind Republican tax policy (for example, Chamber of 
Commerce, Business Roundtable) may not have wanted to part with the 
interest deduction just yet. Meanwhile, those who advocate higher business 
taxes would probably not choose to trade the interest deduction for 
permanent expensing.120 And so Democrats do not appear a likely 
constituency for eliminating the interest deduction on terms that would 
appeal to any Republicans. Indeed, the most recent bipartisan tax reform 
bill introduced to Congress—by Democrat Ron Wyden and Republican 
Dan Coats in 2011—did not propose substantial changes to the interest 
deduction, but instead proposed “to disallow the part of the deduction that 
reflects inflation.”121  And what now that Democrats hold unified control 
of the government? Eliminating the corporate interest deduction did not 
 
118. Noel B. Cunninghah, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 
52 TAX L. REV. 17 (1996); Alvin C. Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax 
Arbitrage, THE TAX LAWYER 549, 552-53 (1985). 
119. I.R.C. § 168(k) 
120. Because interest payments on debt used to acquire a particular investment usually 
amount to less than the face value of the investment, a rational businessperson would happily 
include interest payments in exchange for deducting the full purchase price of the investment. Of 
course, some businesses may borrow to fund expenses that are already deductible, with or without 
bonus depreciation (e.g. employee wages or services). Whether trading the interest deduction for 
permanent expensing would be a net revenue loser ultimately depends on the relative share of 
borrowing for capital investments compared to borrowing for deductible expenses in the business 
sector in aggregate.  
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appear on a wish list of twelve top “tax loopholes” to close, circulated by 
Senate Democrats in 2013.122 Democrats could conceivably come around 
to reducing the interest deduction, but it does not appear to be one of the 
top priorities for which they would be willing to risk political capital.  Nor 
has the economic crisis brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic altered 
these legislative appetites. In fact, the CARES Act took a step in the 
opposite direction, expanding the availability of the interest deduction 
relative to changes made in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (discussed 
below).123 Some Democratic Members criticized the Federal Reserve 
during the spring and summer of 2020 for channeling its bond purchases to 
companies that laid off workers, paid dividends during the pandemic, or 
have been accused of illegal conduct, but at no point did these criticisms 
coalesce into a critique of corporate borrowing in general or a proposal to 
modify the interest deduction in response.124 
No matter the opening positions that legislators may take, 
compromise is near-inevitable in the legislative process. If a complete 
repeal of the interest deduction turns out to be a political longshot—
whether for the reasons I have named or the probability of compromise 
more generally—policymakers should craft compromise proposals that 
achieve as much of the potential benefit as possible while raising relatively 
little controversy. Insofar as we are interested in reducing excessive 
corporate debt, we can craft modified interest deduction proposals to 
pursue that goal while leaving some share of the existing deduction intact. 
Moreover, framing a reform of the interest deduction as a way to reduce 
business leverage and protect against macroeconomic risk might appeal to 
legislators from both parties, at least compared to framing it as closing a 
tax loophole, which typically appeals to Democrats but not Republicans. 
The value of crafting a well-targeted reform of the interest deduction 
becomes clear upon considering the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which 
narrowed the interest deduction in certain ways but did not tailor it to the 
problem of excessive leverage. 
 
122. The Senate Democrats’ List of Tax Breaks to Axe, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE 
FED. BUDGET (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/senate-democrats-list-tax-breaks-axe 
[https://perma.cc/GVG6-KDHN]. 
123. As part of the CARES Act, Congress enacted a temporary update to the interest 
deduction that raises the allowable deduction from 30% of income to 50% of income for the 2019 
and 2020 tax years. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(10). 
124. See, e.g., Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate Bond Purchases During the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS (Sep. 23, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Report%20
%289-23-2020%29_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX2T-PMU9]; Zachary Warmbrodt, Congress 
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D. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Limits the Interest Deduction, but Is 
Poorly Targeted 
Congress enacted the most significant change to business interest 
taxation in decades as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 
Corporations may now only deduct interest up to 30% of the sum of their 
adjusted taxable income and business interest income. The new rule is a 
“thin capitalization rule,” as found in many foreign tax systems.125 These 
rules, which limit the deductibility of interest in relation to capital 
structure, have been shown to effectively reduce corporate debt.126 But the 
precise structure of the rule matters: for example, limits conditioned on 
debt-to-asset ratios reduce those ratios, while restrictions only on internal 
leverage (for example, subsidiary borrowing from parent) do not reduce 
group-wide debt.127 
Researchers have not yet been able to isolate the effect of the TCJA 
on corporate debt levels, but the Wharton Budget Model has estimated 
that about 10% of business interest expenses will be disallowed due to the 
new § 163(j), and that combined with a change to the corporate tax rate, 
the ratio of corporate capital to corporate debt will decline by 7-9% over 
the 2020s.128 The question remains, however, whether the TCJA’s thin 
capitalization rule is designed to reduce the forms of debt that are most 
macroeconomically risky. To that point, there are several ways to structure 
a partial interest deduction, each of which serves a different purpose. It 
could be limited in relation to corporate income (the TCJA approach), 
limited in relation to the firm’s total interest expense (as Robert Pozen and 
Lucas Goodman propose), or limited in relation to the firm’s ratio of debt 
to equity (as I propose). 
The TCJA’s revamped § 163(j) is less well-targeted than alternative 
options. Interestingly, the House Committee Report named the problem 
this provision meant to solve as “companies undertaking more leverage 
 
125. For a review of recent iterations of the thin capitalization rule in Germany, the 
largest non-U.S. economy to have such a rule, see Martin Ruf & Dirk Schindler, Debt Shifting and 
Thin-Capitalization Rules – German Experience and Alternative Approaches, 1 NORDIC TAX J. 
17 (2015). 
126. Jennifer Blouin et al., Thin Capitalization Rules and Multinational Firm Capital 
Structure (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 14/12, 2014) (finding that interest deduction 
limitations indexed to an affiliate’s total debt-to-asset ratio reduced this ratio on average by 1.9%); 
Hermann Buslei & Martin Simmler, The Impact of Introducing an Interest 
Barrier - Evidence from the German Corporation Tax Reform (DIW Discussion Papers 1215, 
2012) (estimating that German firms affected by the 2008 thin capitalization law have reduced 
their debt-to-asset ratios by 5.3%, an 8% reduction from the previous level). 
127. Id.  
128. Lower Corporate Debt Projected Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, PENN 
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than they would in the absence of the tax system.”129 Limiting the 
deductibility of interest would encourage equity finance and lead to “a 
more efficient capital structure for firms.”130 Given this goal, the 
Committee added, quite logically, that limitations on the deductibility of 
interest should be applied “to those businesses with the greatest levels of 
leverage.”131 But the enacted § 163(j) does not distinguish between 
companies based on their leverage level. Instead, it limits the deduction of 
interest beyond the sum of interest income and 30% of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted taxable income.132 Accordingly, a firm could have a reasonable 
debt-equity ratio but still be denied deductions if it had low profits. 
Conversely, a firm could finance entirely with debt so long as it brings in 
sufficient income that interest payments never exceed 30% of income. In 
the short term, this arrangement would seem to satisfy any Congressional 
concerns about financial distress: the firm’s income is high and its financial 
position appears to be strong. But, if and when conditions change and the 
firm’s income falls, the choice to be entirely debt-financed will suddenly 
appear reckless. Moreover, it is not declines in income alone that can sink 
heavily indebted companies. For companies with collateralized debt, 
declining value of that collateral can trigger margin calls and force a 
liquidity crisis.133 This suggests that measuring debt in relation to income is 
insufficient to anticipate which companies will be at risk of distress. 
The second problem with § 163(j), as an attempt to limit corporate 
leverage, is that its focus is limited to forms of debt that could be included 
in U.S. income in the first place. But U.S. firms can obtain leverage by 
borrowing offshore and taking advantage of interest deductions in non-
U.S. jurisdictions.134 Alternatively, they can borrow in the United States 
and lend the proceeds to an affiliated entity outside the country. In the first 
scenario, the firm could take an interest deduction against its income in the 
foreign jurisdiction (depending on the tax laws of that country). In the 
second scenario, the U.S. firm would necessarily generate sufficient 
interest income (from interest payments made to it by the non-U.S. 
 
129. H.R. REP. NO. 115-409, at 247 (2017). 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 248. 
132. The limit also includes the taxpayer’s floor plan financing interest. 
133. In the recent bankruptcy of Hertz Global Holdings Inc., for example, a precipitous 
decline in income due to the COVID-19 pandemic weakened the company, but the proximate 
cause of bankruptcy seems to have been margin calls on its vehicle-backed debt, triggered by the 
declining value of used cars. Becky Yerak, Hertz Fleet Losing Value by the Day, Hindering 
Restructuring Efforts, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hertz-fleet-
losing-value-by-the-day-hindering-restructuring-efforts-11590616785?mod=itp_wsj&ru=yahoo 
[https://perma.cc/WJ84-LDCL]. 
134. Robert E. Holo, Jasmine N. Hay & William J. Smolinski, Not So Fast: 163(j), 245A, 
and Leverage in the Post-TCJA World, 128 YALE L.J. 383, 389 (2018) (“Although Congress’s aim 
may have been to reduce incentives for using significant debt in acquisition and capital structures, 
post-TCJA § 163(j) may instead incentivize large multinational corporations to seek out modified 
capital structures that are not subject to § 163(j), such as offshore debt or debt-like instruments.”). 
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affiliate) to claim a full deduction for the original loan.135 This might seem 
like an issue of the fundamental design of the international tax regime, that 
is, how to deal with arbitrage between jurisdictions with different rates, 
inclusions, and deductions. But one need not resolve those issues in order 
to design a version of § 163(j) that takes into account a corporation’s entire 
global capital structure. 
While no econometric studies have yet been able to untangle the 
impact of § 163(j) from other factors affecting the corporate debt market, 
tax journalists have reported that companies are not substantially changing 
their financing practices in response to the new rules. In a June 2019 article, 
Bloomberg Tax’s Lydia O’Neal raised four reasons why companies were 
not moved by the modified interest deduction: that 30% of income was not 
a difficult limit for most companies; the possibility of carrying forward 
one’s excess interest indefinitely to future years; exemptions for certain 
industries including real estate; and that even for companies that run up 
against the 30% ceiling, a substantial, if incomplete, deduction remains 
better than none.136 As one tax advisor stated, “Why would I stop issuing 
debt that’s limited as opposed to issuing equity that’s not deductible at 
all?”137 This comment suggests that in order to change firms’ calculus, the 
law might need to forbid any interest deduction, at least for the most 
heavily indebted firms. Each shortcoming likewise could be addressed by 
careful design choices for a modified interest deduction. Nondeductible 
interest payments might expire after a certain number of years, or not be 
carried forward at all. High-debt industries (like real estate) might not be 
exempted from the rule entirely, but rather subjected to different limits 
(for example, a higher debt-equity threshold, as I propose below).138 Most 
fundamentally, the 30% income limit would become irrelevant if the 
limitation were conditioned on capital structure, as I propose below. 
E. The Interest Deduction Should Be Conditioned on Capital Structure 
In my proposal, a corporation would be allowed to deduct a fixed 
proportion of the interest on its debt so long as its level of debt was at or 
below a statutory target. A firm that meets the target might be allowed to 
deduct all its interest, or alternatively only a fraction along the lines of the 
65% number proposed by Pozen and Goodman.139 Firms with debt levels 
 
135. Id. at 390. 
136. Lydia O’Neal, Debt Still Holds Allure for Companies Despite Tax Law Restriction, 
BLOOMBERG TAX (Jun. 10, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/debt-still-
holds-allure-for-companies-despite-tax-law-restriction [https://perma.cc/93XQ-8WEH]. 
137. Id. 
138. I.R.C. § 163(j)(7) exempts utility businesses, “any electing farming business,” and 
“any electing real property trade or business.” 
139. Robert C. Pozen & Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate 
Interest Expense, TAX NOTES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-
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above the statutory target would be allowed to deduct only a smaller 
fraction of their interest, perhaps as low as zero (as suggested in Section 
IV.D above). The target could be formulated as a debt-to-equity ratio, as 
a debt-to-income (for example, debt-to-EBITDA) ratio, or as a more 
customized, firm-by-firm calculation of default probability (that is, akin to 
bond ratings). At a high level, these are three alternative ways of telling 
whether a firm has “too much” debt. But there is a significant choice to be 
made among them, as different sorts of firms will qualify under each 
alternative measurement. I will review each option in turn. 
Conditioning deductibility on a debt-to-income ratio would be 
relatively more similar to the structure of § 163(j), discussed above, in that 
a firm with high income could afford to carry high debt and still enjoy 
deductibility. If income suddenly declines, that firm finds itself over-
burdened with debt. To see this problem in action, consider why, as part of 
the CARES Act, Congress enacted a temporary update to the interest 
deduction that raises the allowable deduction from 30% of income to 50% 
of income for the 2019 and 2020 tax years.140 Given the expectation that 
many firms would lose income in 2020, a constant level of debt payments 
would suddenly eat up a larger percentage of taxable income. But this 
experience demonstrates the disadvantage of formulating interest limits as 
percentages of income. Any limit on deducting interest will appear 
counterproductive during a downturn: as incomes decline, so does the 
allowable deduction. In 2020, Congress was able to act, adjusting the 
deduction limit for the year. But there is no guarantee that Congress will 
be able to do the same during each subsequent macroeconomic slump, 
especially if the downturn is less noticeable and salient in real-time than 
the 2020 experience. The lesson is that Congress should formulate the 
interest limit in a way that applies relatively consistently across phases of 
the business cycle, or else it will be forced to update the provision each 
time incomes change while interest payments remain fixed in place. 
The next alternative is to use a bespoke measure of each firm’s 
financial health or default probability. In theory, corporate bond ratings 
seem well-suited for this role; Congress could set the threshold for non-
deductibility at the top of the high yield category, or those below BBB-. 
But many smaller firms do not have publicly rated bonds, and so equitable 
administration would require an objective metric calculated on the basis of 
financial statements. One approach would be to use a reputable 
bankruptcy prediction model from the finance literature, such as Altman’s 




140. I.R.C. § 163(j)(10). 
141. The Z-score is calculated as: 1.2(Net Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4(Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3(Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets) + 0.6(Market 
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correspond empirically to bonds rated BB and below, suggesting that Z-
scores could be used to target the equivalent of the high-yield category for 
the complete universe of rated and unrated bonds.142 However, a tool like 
the Z-score aspires to greater precision than Congress may wish to apply. 
While Z-scores (as well as bond ratings) are meant to help banks 
discriminate credit risk among individual borrowers, there is an argument 
that Congress should set a broad standard with respect to healthy capital 
structure, and not punish or reward companies for idiosyncratic 
circumstances, even if those circumstances really do affect default risk. 
After all, public policy is concerned with the possibility of mass default and 
attendant macroeconomic harm, not isolated individual bankruptcies. The 
purpose of an interest deduction limit like the one I propose is to shift 
corporate debt practices on a broad scale, not to accurately identify and 
deny a deduction to every last distressed firm. Further, as an administrative 
matter, it would be easier for the IRS to administer a relatively blunter 
measure like a debt-to-income or debt-to-equity ratio.143 
On these considerations, Congress should condition the interest 
deduction on firms’ debt-equity ratios—the simplest measurement of 
whether a firm has too much debt. Additionally, this metric should be 
calculated based on the book value of equity rather than its market value. 
This is because market value of equity is subject to volatile swings based 
on investors’ changing perceptions. A debt-equity ratio based on book 
values will be a more stable construct than a ratio that takes income and/or 
market value into account. Stability is desirable both for the firms 
themselves (who want to anticipate their tax obligations) and for Congress, 
so as to avoid having to amend the Code in response to economic 
downturns like in 2020. The next issue is whether to use the same target 
debt-equity ratio across all firms, or to vary the target by industry. It is 
typical for firms in asset-heavy industries to carry more debt. But the 
difference in median debt-equity ratios between asset-heavy and asset-
light industries is small compared to the difference between the banking 
 
Value of Equity/Book Value of Liabilities) + 1.0(Sales/Total Assets). Scores below 1.8 indicate 
that bankruptcy is possible. Edward I. Altman, Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: 
Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA® Models, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN EMPIRICAL FINANCE (Adrian R. Bell, Chris Brooks & Marcel Prokopczuk eds., 
2013). 
142. Edward Altman, 50 Years of Z-Score: What Have We Learned and Where Are We 
in the Credit Cycle?, CFA INDIA SOC. 10 (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://financedocbox.com/Mutual_Funds/126823153-50-years-of-z-score-what-have-we-learned-
and-where-are-we-in-the-credit-cycle.html [https://perma.cc/RYB8-4PWQ]. 
143. A related measure preferred by some analysts would be the ratio of debt to pretax 
operating profits. See John Lonski, Ratio of Debt to EBITDA Is a Poor Predictor of the Default 
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and financial services industries and all others.144 Therefore, the simplest 
way to administer the limited interest deduction would be to use one 
maximum debt-equity ratio for financial services firms, and a second 
maximum ratio for all others. The mean debt-to-equity ratio for non-
financial firms is around 1.0, while the mean ratios for money center banks 
and other financial services firms are 1.8 and 19.0, respectively. Ultimately, 
Congress should delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury to set and 
maintain these ratios. The Secretary might set the target ratios slightly 
above these observed means, effectively denying complete deductions to 
only a minority of firms with the largest debt loads. And by delegating the 
decision to the agency level, Treasury would be able to adjust the ratios 
every few years as prevailing leverage practices change. 
Just as the rule should distinguish between industries, it should also 
distinguish between mature and early-stage companies. Early-stage 
companies tend to be highly leveraged for several reasons. Credit markets 
are much more developed than equity markets for small businesses, 
especially those operating on a local level. Nearly every town has a bank 
that makes loans, but very few have venture capitalists willing to take 
equity in a young company. Even when outside equity is available, the 
owners of early-stage companies may be reluctant to take outside 
investment in order to preserve their own equity stake and that of early 
employees. This preference can be viewed as an offshoot of the pecking 
order theory discussed in Section I.C: when managers are highly optimistic 
about the firm’s future compared to outside investors (as is the case for 
many owner-operators), they prefer to issue debt over equity. One survey 
of new businesses started in 2004 and interviewed over the next seven years 
found that the average firm’s financial capital consisted of 51% debt, or a 
debt-equity ratio of about 1.04.145 A second study performed on a more 
comprehensive version of the same underlying survey data found that the 
average firm consisted of 53% debt, or a debt-equity ratio of about 1.13.146 
These ratios are only slightly larger than the mean for non-financial firms 
as a whole. Still, these firms face a different situation in that nearly all their 
equity is owner equity. If they seek to raise outside capital, debt may be 
the only realistic option. The same interest limitation that gives mature 
firms a viable option of using equity could unduly penalize these younger 
firms that need debt to grow. For this reason, small and early-stage firms 
should be exempt from the modified interest deduction. And because these 
 
144. Data made available by Professor Aswath Damodaran, 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/dbtfund.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3G3T-V563]. 
145. Susan Coleman, Carmen Cotei & Joseph Farhat, The Debt-Equity Financing 
Decisions of US Startup Firms, 40 J. ECON. & FIN. 105, 111-12 (2016). 
146. Alicia M. Robb & David T. Robinson, The Capital Structure Decisions of New 
Firms, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 153, 164 (2014). 
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firms are relatively small, it is less likely that their defaults would 
contribute to macroeconomic risk to nearly the same degree of larger 
firms. This consideration provides a good reason to define the exempt 
category by reference to firm size rather than firm age. A convenient 
threshold is the Small Business Administration’s definition of a small 
business, which varies by NAICS industry code and may be defined by 
either number of employees or annual receipts.147 The SBA definitions 
provide a more fine-grained definition of small business than the 
exemption currently written into § 163(j)(3), which exempts businesses 
with average receipts under $25 million from the 30% of taxable income 
limitation.148 The modified interest deduction should state that any small 
business, defined as such under 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, shall be allowed a 
deduction of all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year, regardless 
of debt-equity ratio. 
Structured this way, the rule would directly address the problem of 
excessive corporate debt. The hypothetical large firm with 100% debt and 
steady income would not be entitled to a full deduction under this rule. Nor 
would international tax gamesmanship present a problem. Each firm 
would be required to report its global debt-equity ratio, accounting for all 
securities issued in the U.S. and abroad.  Firms would still be able to claim 
interest deductions in foreign jurisdictions for their foreign borrowing, but 
the point is that the U.S. tax system would take that borrowing into account 
in determining how much of a deduction to grant for U.S. debt. By 
distinguishing between firms based on leverage ratios, this proposal would 
directly address the financial distress concerns that motivated the 2017 
House Committee Report to state that a limit on deductibility should be 
applied “to those businesses with the greatest levels of leverage.” In 
addition, this formulation seems likely to fall within the comfort zone of 
the Congressional drafters in that it resembles a debt-equity limit that the 
former § 163(j) used for a more limited purpose prior to the TCJA.149 
Limiting interest deductions on the basis of target debt-equity ratios is also 
a well-established practice internationally: most European companies have 
maintained thin capitalization rules triggered by debt-equity ratios around 
3:1 or 4:1, although in most cases these rules only restrict the deductibility 
of interest on loans provided to the domestic company by a foreign parent 
or affiliate (as was the case for the pre-2017 § 163(j)).150 
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Implementing the limited interest deduction would require several 
additional decisions as well as ongoing enforcement infrastructure. One 
key design decision is whether to allow firms to carry forward 
nondeductible interest to future years. As discussed above, the ability to 
carryforward interest costs indefinitely has reportedly limited the bite of § 
163(j). The German thin capitalization rule limits the use of unused interest 
deductions to a five-year period. Carryforwards make some sense in the 
context of rules like § 163(j) or the German equivalent, where taxpayers 
are allowed to deduct interest up to a threshold; anything above the 
threshold can be counted in the next year. But carryforwards make less 
sense under the leverage ratio rule, where no interest whatsoever is 
deductible for a firm above the debt target. Allowing a firm to deduct all 
its year-old interest in the subsequent year, so long as it squeezed below 
the debt target, would undermine the point of having disallowed a 
deduction in the original year. The rule would have a stronger incentive 
effect on financing decisions by allowing no workaround for firms that take 
on nondeductible debt. 
The ongoing administration of the limited interest deduction would 
require annual information on each taxpayer firm’s global debt equity 
ratio. The IRS could use a lightly modified version of Form 8926 to collect 
this information.151 Prior to 2017, Form 8926 was used to calculate 
taxpayers’ debt-equity ratio for the purpose of policing the interest 
deduction between related-party borrowers and lenders and could easily 
be adopted for this new purpose. Form 8926 would be a mandatory annual 
submission for all corporations and partnerships that do not fall under the 
small firm exemption, discussed above. The IRS would be responsible for 
auditing tax returns to investigate suspicious understatements of taxpayer 
indebtedness, just as it audits returns for other accounting issues. 
Conclusion 
In this Note, I have argued that the Federal Reserve’s coronavirus 
lending programs are the final straw that should end the long-standing 
debate over the deductibility of corporate debt. Tax incentive and bailout 
protection combine to produce a bias in favor of debt finance, at a time 
when American companies are already dangerously over-leveraged. The 
best solution would be to completely eliminate the interest deduction. If 
Congress is not willing to go that far, the 2017 Tax Act’s reformulation of 
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§ 163(j) indicates a willingness to put a limit on the deduction. In that case, 
I have argued that the limit should better target the firms with the riskiest 
capital structures, as measured by debt-equity ratios. 
Corporate debt levels are the product of many factors: firm size, 
profitability, interest rates, tax rules, the equity risk premium, bankruptcy 
rules, the market for corporate control, and institutional features of capital 
markets.152 Any effort to reduce overall debt levels must take all these 
factors into account. Scholars conventionally treat some of these factors 
(for example, tax) as subject to deliberate policymaking, while others are 
treated as emergent outcomes of private markets. The effect of expected 
bailouts like the Fed’s coronavirus lending programs falls somewhere in 
the middle of that continuum. Bailouts are a policy choice, but they are 
difficult to commit to (or commit to avoid) in advance. For that reason, it 
makes the most sense to treat bailouts as a likely but relatively 
uncontrollable feature of the government’s overall capital markets policy, 
and to adjust those policies that can be controlled to compensate for the 
resulting debt bias. 
A critic might reply that, by my logic, a complete analysis of federal 
capital structure policy should not be limited to taxes and bailouts alone. I 
agree. Among other factors that bear on capital structure decisions, the 
one with the closest connection to federal law is undoubtedly the cost of 
bankruptcy. Researchers estimate that financial distress typically costs 10-
20% of firm value.153 The concept of distress costs includes both indirect 
costs—that is, the impaired ability to conduct business—and direct costs, 
or the legal and administrative costs of reorganization and/or bankruptcy 
proceedings.154 Federal policy has a relatively tenuous connection to 
indirect costs, which are mostly a function of private counterparties’ 
willingness to deal with a distressed firm. But federal bankruptcy law has a 
relatively direct relationship to the direct costs of filing and proceeding 
through bankruptcy court. The more expensive the bankruptcy process, 
the less likely are firms to issue debt (for example, federal law could 
discourage debt by charging very high fees to use the bankruptcy system). 
One difficulty is that there is no obvious baseline for how expensive the 
bankruptcy system should “naturally” be. With due respect for the truism 
that no policy choice is natural, it is at least analytically simple to compare 
the interest deduction to a putative baseline where interest is not 
deductible, or to compare the Fed’s corporate debt purchases with the 
prior status quo where there were no such purchases. It is much less clear 
whether the current bankruptcy regime is more or less costly than the 
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manifold alternatives. Still, research on how the federal bankruptcy law 
affects corporate financing decisions relative to plausible alternatives 
would be a welcome addition to my claim that federal policy, in total, 
encourages debt. 
Beyond tax and bankruptcy, scholars should reevaluate additional 
aspects of federal law and policy in light of the Fed’s new debt subsidy. The 
overarching principle is that, as a potential creditor of distressed firms, the 
federal government should take an interest in mitigating such distress in 
the first place. In antitrust merger review, this might mean taking into 
account the level of debt that an acquirer takes on to finance the 
transaction. As discussed in Part I, the predominant use of leveraged loans 
is to finance acquisitions. A recent IMF report on global financial stability 
pointed to debt-funded M&A as a growing source of systemic financial 
risk.155 The FTC and DOJ’s merger review processes do not currently take 
macroeconomic risk into account among their criteria for approving a 
transaction, but Congress should consider adding it into the equation. It 
may even be possible to argue, under current law, that mergers that 
increase systemic risk (in the form of default risk and attendant market 
disruption) are harmful to competition and can be blocked as violations of 
the Clayton Act.156 Merger review is an appropriate forum for policing 
excessive debt because (a) it is one of the few circumstances in which, 
under current law, the federal government can accept or reject proposed 
transaction structures, and (b) a large share of high-yield debt is assumed 
in the context of mergers and acquisitions in the first place. 
Of course, the irregularity of merger review is not ideal for any effort 
to regulate corporate debt levels on an ongoing basis. The federal 
government might go further and institute direct capital and/or liquidity 
requirements on non-financial firms, analogous to those that apply to 
banks. Nathan Tankus poses liquidity regulation as a direct alternative to 
the twinned policies of raising corporate taxes during good times and 
bailing out corporations in crises.157 He suggests that liquidity requirements 
can function as a compulsory savings mechanism and may meet less 
political resistance than corporate taxes because they are perceived as 
temporary and allow firms to keep assets on “their own” balance sheets. 
Of course, liquidity requirements and taxes need not be mutually exclusive. 
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As for capital regulation, one can find shadows of minimum capital 
requirements in the “thin capitalization” tax rules discussed in Section 
IV.B above, and in the common law practice of piercing the corporate veil 
when a firm is suspiciously under-capitalized.158 But outright capital 
requirements for non-financial firms have not received much academic or 
policy attention.159 Though bank capital requirements present a salient 
constraint for nearly all banks, which are typically funded overwhelmingly 
with debt, any one-size-fits-all capital requirement would likely only be 
relevant for a small portion of non-financial firms that come near the 
minimum equity ratio.160 Given that industries vary greatly in their typical 
borrowing practices, capital requirements would probably be best pursued 
on a sector by sector basis. 
As a matter of political institutions, a limited interest deduction would 
fit more neatly into the current structure of the administrative state than a 
capital requirement. The IRS already reviews corporate income 
statements, while no federal agency exists to regulate corporate assets in 
the manner that the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency regulate bank assets. Institutional path dependence predicts 
that capital structure policy will remain a matter of tax policy. All the more 
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